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Abstract
Although economic historians consider technical change to be a significant factor explaining
the evolution of the spatial organization of an economy, economic geography still fails to
address this important issue. By developing a simple two-region general equilibrium model
under monopolistic competition, we show that agglomeration is triggered by technological
progress shifting production towards more skill intensive techniques.
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Although economic historians consider technological change as being a signiﬁcant factor explain-
ing the evolution of the spatial organization of an economy (Mokyr, 1995), economic geography
still fails to address this important issue (Fujita et al., 1999). It is recognized by now that techno-
logical change has favored the employment of more skilled workers at the expense of less skilled
workers (see Acemoglu, 2002). In this paper, we show how such technological developments
aﬀect the agglomeration of industrial production.
Economic geography models usually assume that mobile ﬁrms require just one type of input:
skilled mobile workers (see Fujita et al., 1999). Although some location models do allow for
multiple requirements in terms of skills, they are either partial equilibrium models (Michel et
al., 1996) or the needs for skilled and unskilled workers are independent (Forslid and Ottaviano,
2003) so that such approaches are inappropriate for analyzing the spatial eﬀects of technical
change.
The eﬀects of the implementation of technical advances leading to a higher proportion of
skilled workers over unskilled ones on the location process is captured in a simple manner in a
general equilibrium model of location and trade under monopolistic competition. This model
is developed in the next section. Section 3 determines and analyzes equilibrium wages as well
as skill composition in each region. We show that, when the spatial distribution of ﬁrms is
exogenous, technical changes in the economy promote the spatial concentration of skilled workers
in the region hosting the majority of modern ﬁrms. Finally, section 4 analyzes the impact of
technological change on the location of ﬁrms. It appears that the agglomeration of modern ﬁrms
and skilled workers is more likely to occur when technologies are skill-intensive and trade costs
are low enough.
2T h e m o d e l
The economy consists of two regions, labeled r =1 ,2. Variables associated with each region will
be subscripted accordingly. There are two production factors, skilled and unskilled labor as well
as two sectors, traditional and modern sectors. We denote by H the total mass of skilled and
by L the total mass of unskilled workers in the economy. Each worker supplies one unit of his
type of labor inelastically. The two types of workers diﬀer also in terms of mobility. Unskilled
workers are perfectly mobile between sectors but geographically immobile, and are assumed to
be uniformly distributed between the two regions: L1 = L2 = L/2. Skilled workers are mobile
across regions and reside in the region oﬀering them the higher indirect utility so that Hr the
mass of skilled workers located in region r is endogenous. Such assumptions on spatial mobility
are in line with empirical observations (see Faini, 1999).
All workers in the economy have the same Cobb-Douglas utility function U = T1−μMμ,
where μ ∈ (0,1) is a constant, T a ‘traditional’ homogeneous good and M an aggregate of










where n is the total mass of varieties available in the economy, q(i) is the consumption of variety
i ∈ [0,n] and σ>1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of the
diﬀerentiated good.
The sector producing the homogeneous good is assumed to be perfectly competitive. This
good is freely traded so that its price is the same everywhere (pT
1 = pT
2 ). The production of
one unit of the traditional good T requires one unit of unskilled labor so that proﬁt-maximizing
prices are given by pT
r = wl
r where wl
r is the wage rate prevailing in region r. We choose good T
1as numeraire, what implies wl
r =1 . We assume that this sector is always active in both regions
whatever the spatial allocation of modern ﬁrms. A suﬃcient condition is that μ<1/2.
Firms in the modern sector produce under monopolistic competition and increasing returns
by using skilled and unskilled workers. There is a one-to-one relation between ﬁrms and vari-
eties. Trade between regions in modern goods implies trade costs, modeled as iceberg costs: for
one unit of the diﬀerentiated good to reach the other region, τ>1 units must be shipped. Pro-
duction of x(i) units of variety i requires a production process and administration services. For
instance, these services can include management and monitoring functions as well as research
and development functions. More precisely, administration incurs a ﬁxed input requirements of
f units of both skilled and unskilled labour while production incurs a marginal input require-
ment of mx units of unskilled labour. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the
ﬁxed requirement of both skilled and unskilled workers is captured by a Cobb-Douglas type
technology with a share η of skilled workers. This choice of technology serves only the purpose
of simple illustration. The results hold for any constant returns to scale technology in which one
technology is relatively skill intensive. Hence, an increase in η encapsulates the technological bias
hypothesis by which the implementation of technical advances is reﬂected in a higher proportion
of skilled workers over unskilled ones. Note that our model can be considered as an extension
of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) where they consider η =1 .






r)η + mxr(i) (2)
where the second equality stems from the fact that wl
r =1and wh
r is the wage of skilled workers
prevailing in region r.
In what follows, we can restrict the analysis to the case of a representative ﬁrm for each
region since ﬁrms have the same access to the technology and to the demand. We also assume,
without loss of generality that m =( σ−1)/σ < 1. The price maximising the proﬁt πr = prxr−cr
of a ﬁr ms e tu pi nr e g i o nr =1 ,2 is given by
pr =1 (3)
Entry as well as exit of ﬁr m si sf r e ei ne a c hr e g i o ns ot h a tp r o ﬁts are zero in equilibrium.
The output of each ﬁrm can hence be expressed as
xr = σf(wh
r)η (4)
It appears that, when wages are ﬁxed, a marginal increase in η raises the level of production in
both regions.
The total demand for a variety produced in region r implies:
xr = μ(RrPσ−1
r + φRsPσ−1
s ) with φ ≡ τ1−σ (5)
where Pr (resp. Ps)a n dRr (resp. Rs) are the CES price indices of region r (resp. of region
s 6= r)a n dt h ei n c o m eo fr e g i o nr (resp. of region s 6= r). They can be expressed as, respectively,








23 Equilibrium wages and skill composition
In order to disentangle the various eﬀects at work, it is convenient to ﬁrst analyze the case where
ﬁrms are supposed to be immobile, i.e. nr is exogenous. The study of the conﬁguration where
they are mobile is reported in the next section.
We now consider labor and product markets clearing conditions for a given spatial distribu-
tion of ﬁrms and skilled workers. By using Shephard’s lemma on (1) and by considering (4) and





r =( σ − η)f(wh
r)ηnr (10)
where LM
r is the mass of unskilled labour located in region r and working in the modern sector.
Trivial calculations reveal that LM
r /Hr =( σ − η)wh
r/η. In other words, for a given value of wh
r,
ar i s ei nη favours the demand for skilled workers at the expense of unskilled workers in the
modern sector in each region.
Plugging (4) and (6) as well as (9) and (7) in (5) generates a system of two linear equations in
(wh
1)η and (wh
2)η, that can be solved to obtain the equilibrium skilled wages as explicit function





(σ + μη)(1 − s)φ2 +2 σsφ+( σ − μη)(1 − s)






(σ + μη)sφ2 +2 σ(1 − s)φ +( σ − μη)s
σφ− s(1 − s)(1− φ)[φ(σ + μη) − (σ − μη)]
(12)
where s ≡ n1/n is the share of modern ﬁrms established in region 1. By introducing (11) and








(σ + μη)(1 − s)φ2 +2 σsφ+( σ − μη)(1 − s)
(σ + μη)sφ2 +2 σ(1 − s)φ +( σ − μη)s
≡ Λ
with Λ =1when s =1 /2 and ∂Λ/∂η T 0 when s T 1/2. This means that a change in technology
favoring the employment of the skilled workers has a stronger impact on wages oﬀered by each
ﬁrm in the region hosting the majority of modern ﬁrms, regardless of the spatial distribution of
skilled workers. Indeed, a rise in η increases more the income of the region accomodating the
majority of ﬁrms (see (7) where we have introduced (9)) and, in turn, raises more operating
proﬁts of each ﬁrm located in that region. Hence, ﬁrms can oﬀer higher wages in the region
where they are more numerous, whatever the spatial distribution of workers.
Thus, technical change creates a strong incentive for the skilled workers to locate in the large
region. When the spatial distribution of ﬁrms is ﬁxed, the equilibrium spatial allocation of the
skilled workers is reached when the utility of the skilled workers is identical in both regions, i.e.






2 (see (8)). Hence, by introducing (9) and (11)-(12)




2μsσφ(1 − φ)(1 + φ)(P1/P2)μ/(σ−1)
(1 − s)[(σ + μη)sφ2 +2 σ(1 − s)φ +( σ − μη)s]2(2s − 1)
where ∂(H1/H2)/∂η > 0 when s>1/2. Even though ﬁrms use the same technology in both re-
gions, the implementation of technical advances leading to a higher proportion of skilled workers
over unskilled ones induces the agglomeration of the skilled workers in the large region.
To summarize,
Proposition 1 Assume that the spatial distribution of ﬁrms is exogenous. Technical changes
favouring the employment of skilled workers promote the spatial concentration of skilled workers
in the region hosting the majority of modern ﬁrms.
34 Spatial equilibrium and stability
We can now analyse the location decision of the skilled workers when the spatial distribution
of ﬁrms is endogenous. In this case, a spatial equilibrium arises when no skilled workers may
get a higher utility level in the other region. We assume that local labour markets adjust
instantaneously when some skilled workers move from one region to another region. We use (11)
and (12) giving the equilibrium skilled wages as explicit function of the spatial distribution of
ﬁrms nr and taking into account the relationship between Hr and nr (via (9)). Hence, a spatial
equilibrium arises at s ∈ (0,1) when ∆ω(s)=ω1(s) − ω2(s)=0or at s =0when ∆ω(0) ≤ 0,
or at s =1when ∆ω(1) ≥ 0.B e c a u s e∆ω(s)=ω2(s)[Ω(s) − 1],w h e r eΩ(s) ≡ ω1(s)/ω2(s) or
Ω(s)=
∙
(σ + μη)(1 − s)φ2 +2 σsφ+( σ − μη)(1 − s)
(σ + μη)sφ2 +2 σ(1 − s)φ +( σ − μη)s
¸1/η ∙
1 − s + sφ




where we have introduced (11) and (12) in (8).
Some comments are in order. First, due to trade costs, increasing local expenditures on
diﬀerentiated good raises demand per ﬁrm for a given price index (market size eﬀect). This
in turn raises operating proﬁts implying higher skilled wages. Hence, modern ﬁrms and skilled
workers have an incentive to agglomerate in a single region. On the other hand, for given
expenditures, more ﬁrms reduce the price index inducing a fall in local demand per ﬁrm and,
therefore, in skilled wages (market crowding eﬀect). This eﬀect promotes the dispersion of
modern ﬁrms and skilled workers. Further, market size and market crowding eﬀects inﬂuence
the spatial diﬀerential of skilled wages as follows. It is easy to check that skilled worker wages are
higher in the region hosting the majority of ﬁrms (s>1/2)w h e n e v e rφ>(σ − μη)/(σ + μη).
In other words, the market size eﬀe c td o m i n a t e st h em a r k e tc r o w d i n ge ﬀect when τ and σ are
l o wa sw e l la sw h e nμ and η are high. Finally, the second term of the RHS in (13) shows
the existence of an additional eﬀect inducing of the agglomeration of modern ﬁrms and skilled
workers. Indeed, more ﬁrms raise the purchasing power for a given wage since fewer varieties are
imported and burdened by trade costs (cost-of-living eﬀect). This latter eﬀect does not depend
on technology parameters.
Inspection of (13) reveals that Ω(1/2) = 1 so that full dispersion of ﬁrms (s =1 /2) and, thus,
skilled workers (H1 = H2 = H/2) is always a spatial equilibrium. This symmetric conﬁguration
is stable if and only if for any marginal deviation from the symmetry, the equation of motion
brings the spatial distribution of skilled workers back to the original one. Formally, we must
have Ω0(1/2) < 0. Some calculations show that full dispersion is a stable spatial conﬁguration
when 0 <φ<φ b with
φb ≡
(σ − μη)(σ − 1 − μη)
(σ + μη)(σ − 1+μη)
< 1
where φb > 0 when σ>1+μη (no-black-hole condition, see Fujita et al. (1999)).1 When φ>φ b,
full dispersion ceases to be stable.
Full agglomeration in region 1 is a spatial equilibrium when Ω(1) ≥ 1. It is straighforward
to check that lim
φ→0
Ω(1) < 1 and Ω(1) = 1 when φ =1as well as
dΩ(1)
dφ











Hence, there exists a single value φs above which full agglomeration is a spatial equilibrium. In
other words, whatever the value of η ∈ (0,1], full agglomeration occurs when trade costs are low
enough. Hence, even though the requirements in skilled labor are very low, full agglomeration
1When η =1 ,w eﬁnd the same result obtained by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
4can be triggered, provided that trade costs are very low. Now, we can analyze how φs reacts to
a change in η. The threshold value φs is implicitly deﬁned by Ω(1) = 1, or equivalently, by


































that is negative because 1 >φ>0 and σ−1+μη > 0. Hence, φs decreases with η. In addition,
it is straighforward to check that dφb/dη<0.2 As a result, the agglomeration of modern ﬁrms
and skilled workers is more likely to occur when η increases because the interval of trade costs
under which full dispersion (resp. agglomeration) takes place decreases (resp., increases).
To summarize,
Proposition 2 Technical changes favouring the employment of skilled workers promote indus-
trial clustering provided that trade costs are low enough and the share of expenditures for the
modern industry is high enough.
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